The fight against terrorism at EU level
What
is Europe's role in the fight against terrorism, which is principally a
national competence? What does the EU do to support Member States'
efforts?
In 2010 the European Commission adopted an Internal Security Strategy
for the period from 2010 to 2014. In the coming months, a European
Agenda on Security will be adopted, as foreseen in the Commission
working programme for 2015.
The fight against terrorism is
principally a national competence. However, the European Union supports
Member States' efforts in the following ways:
- Creating a legal environment and framework for cooperation;
- Developing common capabilities and systems such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) or the Civil Protection Mechanism;
- Supporting, notably financially, the establishment of concrete and operational cooperation between practitioners and front line actors via, for example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network, ATLAS (network of the rapid intervention forces), Airpol (network of airports' police) in the fight against terrorism and working together with Member States and stakeholders e.g. in Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and explosives expert groups or the standing committee on precursors;
- Ensuring that security and fundamental rights are built by design into all relevant EU level policies such as transport, energy, etc.
- The Internal Security fund also provides financing to Member States in the field of internal security, including fight against terrorism.
What is the EU doing to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism?...
In 2011, the Commission set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(RAN) which brings together first line practitioners from very
different areas and countries with different societal challenges and
background, working in the health or social sector, associations of
victims, local authorities, representatives from diasporas and local
police, prison or probation officers, teachers, etc. The RAN enabled the
establishment of a vibrant network of experts that identify best
practices, work with people – for instance on campuses or in prisons –
who are drifting into extremism and violence.
In January last year
the Commission put forward a set of actions to strengthen the EU's
response to radicalisation and violent extremism. While preventing
radicalisation and violent extremism is mainly the responsibility of the
Member States, the European Commission and the RAN can assist in
several ways, including by helping member States to put in place
de-radicalisation programmes and by fostering dialogue and cooperation
with civil society in order to prevent radicalisation and extremist
violence. The European Commission has also proposed the creation of a
European Knowledge hub on radicalisation and extremism aiming at
continuing and expanding the work for which the RAN has already laid the
foundation.
What is the EU doing to prevent the financing of Terrorism?
We
need to effectively cut networks that facilitate terrorist activities
from financing. To this end, the Commission will continue to support
implementation of important instruments such as the network of EU
Financial Intelligence Units and anti-money laundering initiative.
The EU concluded with the U.S. an agreement on access to transfer of financial data in the framework of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program ('TFTP Agreement')
which is in force since August 2010. The Terrorist Finance Tracking
System enables identification and tracking of terrorists and their
support networks through targeted searches run on the financial data
provided by the Designated Provider (SWIFT).
The TFTP Agreement is
equipped with a set of robust safeguards to protect EU citizens'
fundamental rights. Europol is responsible for verifying that U.S.
requests for data comply with the conditions stipulated in the Agreement
including that they must be as narrowly tailored as possible in order
to minimise the volume of data requested. Each search on the provided
data must be narrowly tailored and based on information or evidence
demonstrating a reason to believe that the suspect of the search has a
link to terrorism or its financing. Searches are monitored by
independent overseers, including by two persons appointed by the
European Commission.
Reciprocity is a basic principle underlying
the Agreement and two provisions (Articles 9 and 10) are the basis for
Member States as well as, where appropriate, Europol and Eurojust to
benefit from TFTP data. Under the EU rules, National Treasuries must
ensure the availability to law enforcement, public security, or
counter-terrorism authorities of concerned Member States, and, as
appropriate, to Europol and Eurojust, of information obtained through
the TFTP. Since the Agreement entered into force in 2010, more than 7300
investigative leads were generated by the TFTP for the EU.
There
is a significantly growing number of requests related to the phenomenon
of travelling fighters (Syria/Iraq/IS). In 2014, there were 35 TFTP
(Article 10) requests generating 937 intelligence leads of relevance to
11 EU Member States. The TFTP is also used, through Europol, to support
the investigations of the French authorities related to the Paris
attacks.
What is the EU focus on the protection against terrorist attacks?
The
European Commission encourages national law enforcement agencies to
cooperate even more on concrete activities to protect our citizens. To
protect public areas considered as soft-targets, such as museums, sport
and cultural areas, we will further develop guidance material on soft
target protection, similar to the manual produced by the airport police
network (AIRPOL). The Commission will further pursue our efforts to
detect and respond to threats before they materialise – addressing all
public areas as well as critical infrastructures.
What is the EU policy on victims of terrorism?
We
support and empower the survivors and victims of such atrocious attacks
by strengthening support groups and projects that enable to victims to
tell their stories – as part of their recovery and as part to create new
counter-narratives.
Stepping up the fight against terrorism
The
European Commissionwill adopt in the months to come a European Agenda
on Security for 2015-2020, as announced by the Commission, which will
reorient the EU's internal security to meet the challenges posed by
current criminal and terrorist threats. Several important elements are
already under consideration:
- continue to reinforce the efficiency of the Schengen Information System by even more stringent, targeted, informed and non-discriminating controls;
- consider if existing legal penal framework needs reinforcement;
- strengthen cooperation between Europol and other European agencies and threat assessment bodies, notably IntCen (Single Intelligence assessment Centre).
- reinforce work to make relevant information accessible to law enforcement for the purpose of better preventing and pursuing criminal activities across EU and international borders;
- reinforce the exchange of information at EU and international level on illegal firearms.
The European Commission will also continue to work with the European Parliament and the Council to adopt EU rules on a European Passenger Name Record system which will improve our capability to prevent and detect terrorism and serious crime in a world of unimpeded global travel.
What is PNR data and how can PNR databases help fight terrorism?
Passenger
Name Record (PNR) data is unverified information provided by passengers
and collected and held in the air carriers' reservation and departure
control systems for their own commercial purposes. It contains several
different types of information, such as travel dates, travel itinerary,
ticket information, contact details, the travel agent at which the
flight was booked, means of payment used, seat number and baggage
information.
The processing of PNR data allows law enforcement
authorities to identify previously unknown suspects whose travel
patterns are unusual or fit those typically used by terrorists.
Analysis
of PNR data also allows retrospective tracking of the travel routes and
contacts of persons suspected to have been involved in terrorist acts,
thus enabling law enforcement authorities to unveil criminal networks.
What is the state of play on an EU Passenger Name Record proposal?
In February 2011, the Commission presented a proposal
for an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive. The proposal would
oblige Member States to set up PNR systems and establish strict data
protection safeguards for the processing and collection of PNR data from
flights to and from the EU.
The Commission is committed to
ensuring the proposal, which should include high fundamental rights
protection for EU citizens, gets adopted and is working closely with the
European Parliament and the Council to this end.
How
does the Commission intend to reinforce the efficiency of the Schengen
Information System and of the Schengen area in general?
The
existing Schengen legal and technical tools already ensure a high level
of safety for European citizens. Member States need to use the existing
instruments to the greatest extent so that all persons representing a
threat to internal security are appropriately dealt with. The Schengen
Information System (SIS II) has proven to be one of the most efficient
tools in following the travel routes of foreign fighters through
discreet or specific check alerts or to retain them at the external
borders if their travel documents are invalidated and entered into SIS
for seizure. The Commission is currently working together with Member
States to develop a common approach on making the best use of the
possibilities under EU law, both as regards checks on documents and
checks on persons. The tools are there – it is up to Member States to
use them.
What checks does the Schengen System allow for?
As
far as the checks at the external borders are concerned, under the
Schengen Borders Code the Member States must verify the travel documents
of all persons – regardless of their nationality – at the external
borders to establish the identity of the traveller. This includes
verifying that the document is valid and not falsified or counterfeit.
Member States can consult relevant databases (including the SIS
database) for this purpose at each check. The Commission recommends that
Member States carry out consultations of the databases more
intensively, and is concerned that many Member States do not appear to
be doing so.
At the same time, as regards checks on persons inside
the Schengen area, Member States have the possibility, on a
non-systematic basis, to consult national and EU databases to ensure
that persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law do not
represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the
internal security and public policy of the Member States. Such
verification is to be done on the basis of threat assessment, which can
be quite wide-ranging and adapted to the threat represented by foreign
fighters, and allows for checks on all persons covered by that threat
assessment.
As far as the checks within the Member States
territories are concerned, the competent national authorities are
entitled to carry out identity checks on persons present in their
territory to verify for instance the legality of stay or for law
enforcement purposes.
What are the rules to reintroduce internal border checks in the Schengen area?
According
to Article 23 and following of the Schengen Borders Code, Member States
may exceptionally reintroduce border control, where there is a serious
threat to public order or internal security. For foreseeable events, a
Member State must notify the other Member States and the Commission in
advance. In cases requiring urgent action a Member State may immediately
reintroduce border control at internal borders, while, at the same
time, notifying the other Member States and the Commission accordingly.
The reintroduction of border control is in principle limited to 30 days.
In general, if a Member State decides to reintroduce border controls,
the scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction cannot not exceed
what is strictly necessary to address the serious threat.
How is the movement of illegal firearms currently regulated in the EU?
Even
if the use of weapons in criminal attacks is not new, terrorists are
using weapons more and more, in addition to the traditional strategy
which was based on the use of explosives.
Movement of such weapons within the EU is regulated by a procedure laid down in Directive 2008/51/CE
(so-called Firearms Directive) which establishes a system of
authorisation for owners and traders of weapons for civilian use only.
Military weapons cannot be traded to private persons. Under specific
conditions only collectors can keep military weapons. Regulation 258/2012
on illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms establishes rules
for export of weapons for civilian use. This system is based on an
authorisation procedure following the provision of United Nations
Protocol on firearms.
Last year the European Commission launched
an evaluation aimed at improving current practices in the EU as regards
marking, deactivation and destruction of firearms entering in the scope
of EU rules on firearms and the legal requirement for purchasing alarm
weapons and replicas within the EU. An additional evaluation was also
finalised at the end of last year to examine possible policy options,
including the approximation of various relevant offences, to better
prevent, deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, prosecute and cooperate on
illicit arm trafficking in the EU. Based on the results of the
evaluation process carried out, the Commission decide on how to proceed
to amend the Firearms Directive, which could lead to a proposal for
stricter checks for some categories of weapons and by prohibiting the
most dangerous weapons, which are already subject today to mandatory
authorisation. A better exchange of information is also very important
at EU and international level.
What the EU is doing to ensure that necessary funding is available to prevent organised crime and terrorism?
To
promote the implementation of EU law enforcement cooperation, the
management of risks and crises and the control of the Union's external
borders, the Internal Security Fund
(ISF) has been set up for the period 2014-2020 with a total budget of
approximately EUR 3.8 billion (both components of the Fund).
The
primary objectives of actions implemented in the upcoming period are
fighting cross-border and organised crime including terrorism,
preventing and combating radicalisation towards violent extremism and
strengthening the capacity of Member States and the EU to assess risks
to their societies and increase resilience to crises.
An important
focus in spending the funds is placed on prevention. To achieve its
objectives, the EU supports practical cooperation between Member States,
the development of training schemes and knowledge platforms and the
exchange of information between law enforcement authorities and Member
States and EUROPOL. In terms of preventing crises, funding is provided
to measures which enhance Member States' capacity to protect their
critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and to develop
comprehensive threat assessments, including early-warning mechanisms.
Finally,
the EU supports actions geared towards alleviating consequences of
terrorism and extremism. Support to victims is an important component
for which EU funding is used.
How can the EU support Member States affected by a major crisis?
Crisis
management as well as the fight against terrorism remain principally
national competences. The EU has, however, developed tools to support
Member States affected by crises, including major terrorist attacks, and
established crisis coordination arrangements.
‘Response’ is
indeed one of the 4 pillars of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy. The
Solidarity Clause which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty covers
situations of terrorist attacks as well. The EU institutions and
agencies as well as Member States are thus organised to give assistance
to the affected Member States, through the mobilisation of all available
instruments (information exchange, support to the investigations, EU
Civil Protection Mechanism, etc.).
In the event of a terrorist
crisis, the European Commission can also activate its crisis response
mechanisms, including the secure crisis room located in the Strategic
Analysis and Response (STAR) centre, which closely cooperates with the
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the European External
Action Service (EEAS) and EU agencies (Europol, Frontex).
The
Commission also supports cooperation between Member States in the field
of preparedness, through the organisation of crisis management
exercises, in particular with police special intervention units (the
ATLAS network’s ‘Common Challenge 2013’ exercise), as well as to enhance
cooperation between these units and the civil protection community
(‘ARETE 2014’ exercise) to respond to complex crisis scenarios.
What is the EU doing on the security of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and explosives?
The
Commission will finalise the implementation of the Chemical Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosives Action Plans by the end
of 2015. The basis for the Commission’s work on the security of CBRN
substances and Explosives are two action plans: the EU CBRN Action Plan,
which was adopted in 2009 and comprises a wide range of 124 actions
from prevention and detection to preparedness and response, to be
implemented by end of 2015, and the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, with 48 actions.
The Commission also monitors and facilitates the implementation of Regulation 98/2013 on explosives precursors by Member State authorities and economic operators.